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The March 2011 Japan 
Earthquake
Analysis of Losses, Impacts, and Impli-
cations for the Understanding of Risks 
Posed by Extreme Events
by Bijan Khazai, James E. Daniell and 
Friedemann Wenzel, KIT
Socio-economic losses associated with the 
earthquake of magnitude 9 on March 11th, 
2011 off the Tohoku coast of Japan are pre-
sented and discussed. These include pres-
entation of building damage, casualty- and 
shelter needs disaggregated for the earth-
quake and tsunami, but also the implications 
of the loss of essential utilities in Honshu’s 
production capacity, and consequences of 
the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant acci-
dent. We trace the Tohoku catastrophe from 
the initial triggering earthquake through the 
cascading- and network phenomena of the 
Tohoku event, and discuss the concept of 
cascading phenomena triggered by natural 
hazards in society and the economy. Follow-
ing the analysis of the Tohoku event, a sum-
mary of the key interactions of three different 
types of disasters which occurred in 2010 are 
presented in comparison.
1 Introduction
It is well accepted that catastrophes result from 
natural disasters only when the society affected, 
its infrastructure and institutions are too weak to 
cope with and absorb the adverse impacts of an 
event. Thus, we can talk about natural disasters, 
but not about natural catastrophes. This view is 
also reflected in risk assessment, where not only 
the physical elements of risk, but also the fra-
gilities and capacities of people, processes, serv-
ices, organizations, or systems affected must be 
analyzed. This applies not only for all types and 
scales of natural disasters, but also for risk as a 
dynamic interaction between natural phenom-
ena, technological systems, and socio-economic 
aspects. These interactions become particularly 
obvious in the case of large-scale disasters, such 
as the Japan Tohoku event.
In this paper, we trace the path to catastro-
phes through the complex interactions between 
natural hazards, societal conditions, and the vul-
nerability of technical facilities on which the 
functionality of societies are based. The recent 
Tohoku earthquake of March 11th, 2011 and the 
tsunami it induced led to worldwide economic 
disorder and social consequences with political 
impacts. We take the Tohoku event as a case his-
tory for which we analyze the losses, but also 
show the complex network of interactions that 
were manifested in this event.
Even though historic tsunamis and earth-
quakes (e.g., 869 Sanriku, 1896 Meiji-Sanriku 
event) had in fact attained similar magnitudes 
and runup heights in the same areas that were 
affected by the Tohoku event (Hatori 1986), no 
widely-accepted existing scenarios or models 
had foreseen the occurrence of an event of Mw 
9.0. If not a “Black-Swan” event (Taleb 2007), 
the multi-risk and disaster-chain phenomenon 
that was initiated in Japan on March 11th was 
an unprecedented large-scale catastrophe that at 
least could have been imagined. From the initial 
triggering earthquake through the cascading- 
and network phenomena of the Tohoku event, 
we show how several factors within the social, 
economic, technological, and environmental fab-
rics of Japanese society became highly relevant 
in exacerbating the impacts of this event. Fol-
lowing the analysis of the Tohoku event, a brief 
summary of the key interactions of three differ-
ent types of disasters which occurred in 2010 
(the Haiti earthquake, the Russian wildfires, and 
the Pakistan floods) are presented in comparison. 
Our aim is to show that the path to large-scale 
disasters should be sought and found within the 
key interactions between natural disaster, soci-
etal weakness, and the vulnerability of technical 
facilities. Finally, we draw conclusions from our 
observations and analysis with implications for 
addressing extreme events.
2 Characteristics of the Tohoku Earthquake
The Tohoku earthquake and the tsunami of March 
11th, 2011 was typical for large-scale disasters 
with cascading expansion. Massive losses due to 
the March-11th earthquake occurred as the result 
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of a chain of impact of three causes: the disas-
trous earthquake, the tsunami it induced, and 
the nuclear power plant incident. The magnitude 
(Mw 9.0) of the earthquake off the Tohoku coast 
of Japan initiated a tsunami with waves of up to 
24 meters in height, which surged as much as 10 
km inland, and devastated large parts of coast-
al Japan, particularly in the densely-populated 
coastal city of Shinomaki. In addition to the tsu-
nami damage, the earthquake caused widespread 
building damage, the collapse of the Funjinuma 
irrigation dam in Sukagawa, widespread fires, 
and emergencies declared at the Fukushima-1 
and -2 nuclear power plants.1
Building damage, human casualties, and 
economic losses are disaggregated for the earth-
quake, the tsunami, and the nuclear power plant. 
It should be noted that none of the results in dis-
aggregating the impacts of the Tohoku events 
have been published elsewhere, and that the fig-
ures shown here are based on extensive investi-
gation into the actual records and on statistical 
analysis. In presenting the losses from Tohoku, 
we also investigate a number of exacerbating 
factors and interactions which led to this event’s 
total impact being much greater than the sum of 
its parts. We show that, while the losses from 
the Tohoku earthquake – an event of rare (low 
probability of occurrence) magnitude – are very 
severe, it was the simultaneous impacts of the 
earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear power 
plant crisis, as well as the complex interactions 
between several key characteristics of the soci-
ety affected and of its infrastructure which led to 
unprecedented conditions that greatly impaired 
the capacity of Japanese society to respond. The 
following will review and summarize some of 
the main characteristics of this event and critical 
interactions between them.
2.1 Impact on Buildings
Over 1,000,000 buildings were damaged, de-
stroyed, or abandoned as a result of these three 
combined disasters (see the additional figures in 
the online version of this issue). No data on the 
relative proportion of earthquake- and tsunami 
damage has as yet been given by government 
sources. Table 1 shows the distribution of dam-
age for coastal and non-coastal municipalities. It 
should be noted that coastal municipalities are 
not narrow strips, but generally extend far inland. 
Thus, it can be assumed that the earthquake also 
contributed to a large extent to the damage in the 
coastal municipalities. To reconstruct the dam-
age that would be expected in the coastal mu-
nicipalities separate from that of the earthquake 
alone, intensity-damage relationships from the 
non-coastal municipalities were compared with 
those of coastal municipalities, as nearly all 
damage in inland municipalities must have been 
earthquake-related.
Table 1: The relative building damage in coastal 
municipalities vs. non-coastal munici-
palities (as of September 28th, 2011)
Buildings Destroyed Partially 
Destroyed
Partially 
Damaged
Coastal Mu-
nicipalities
110,834 129,709 229,943
Non-Coastal 
Municipa-
lities
6,946 48,530 382,537
Total 117,780 178,239 612,480
Source: CATDAT Situation Report 41 (FDMA, Pre-
fectures, NPA etc.) (Daniell, Vervaeck 2011)
2.2 Impact on Key Infrastructure
Japan suffered serious disruptions to its essen-
tial utilities (water and energy) in the wake of 
the earthquake. At least 1.9 million households 
had no water supply, and the army had to be de-
ployed to provide basic essentials, including bot-
tled water, food, and blankets (Stedman 2011). 
The earthquake and the tsunami severely dam-
aged power plants of the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO), including the Fukushima-I 
and -II nuclear facilities that serve metropolitan 
Tokyo and the neighbouring Greater Tokyo in-
dustrial area. About 40 percent of the electricity 
used in the Greater Tokyo area is supplied by nu-
clear power plants in the Niigata and Fukushima 
prefectures. After the quake, TEPCO announced 
a shortfall of 25 percent of the electricity it sup-
plied, and installed a rolling blackout in Tokyo 
and vicinity. It is an aspect of the adaptive re-
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silience of Japanese society for coping with 
such massive energy cuts by adopting measures 
such as reducing commuter-train services, dim-
ming lighting in stores and public installations, 
and turning off some elevators and escalators. 
In most other developed-country settings, this 
would be regarded as an unacceptable failure to 
respond, and would have caused significant po-
litical damage to the governments responsible.
The earthquake-, tsunami-, and nuclear-
plant problems also had devastating impacts on 
Japan’s communications (cellular and landline) 
networks. Two-thirds of Japan’s largest mobile 
provider’s base stations in Northern Japan were 
dead, and it took months to repair them. Had 
it not been for Japan’s resilient internet infra-
structure, which not only sustained damage to 
undersea cables and overland infrastructure, but 
was able to cope with a 200 percent surge in 
traffic in the 24 hours following the disaster, the 
response would have been impeded even more 
seriously (Gold 2011).
Internet connectivity was a key asset in the 
wake of the earthquake, as the internet enabled 
effective communication and information ex-
change via services such as Skype, Facebook, 
Twitter and Mixi (the Japanese social media 
site) despite overloaded and disrupted phone 
networks. This allowed geographically-distant 
people to contribute their unique resources and 
collaborate with people unknown to them. In 
addition, crowdsourcing technologies such as 
Ushahidi were used to visualize the most severe-
ly-affected localities, which helped relief organi-
zations coordinate and prioritize their response 
(Gao et al. 2011). The Japanese internet system 
responded very differently from that seen in the 
2006 Taiwan earthquake, when several broken 
undersea cables left millions of users offline, in 
some cases for months.
Several characteristic geographic, demo-
graphic, and cultural factors in Japan significant-
ly worsened the consequences from the loss of 
key infrastructure after the Tohoku earthquake. 
The aid and medical response in the aftermath 
of the earthquake was complicated by the sheer 
scale of devastation, widespread damage to sup-
ply routes, loss of power- and communications 
networks, and concerns about radiation leaks 
from the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plants. 
Even if the Sendai region, with a population den-
sity of 300 persons per square kilometer, would 
not be considered rural in most of the world, in 
Japan, such areas are considered to be predomi-
nantly rural, and their relative isolation made the 
transport of essential commodities (food, water, 
and fuel, etc), aid materials and rescue teams 
even more difficult. Even communities in the 
Fukushima Prefecture, which are more readily 
accessible than other prefectures because of their 
proximity to the Tokyo metropolitan region, ra-
diation leaks prevented the transport of materials 
and human resources.
The existing shortage of healthcare resourc-
es in rural areas was also exacerbated by the de-
struction of hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes, 
and the loss of healthcare staff. In-patients in the 
damaged hospitals had to be transferred to oth-
er hospitals. In some cases, this was extremely 
difficult, as hospitals and nursing homes for the 
elderly were located in the suburbs of the city, 
or in small towns which were relatively isolated 
from public transportation. The isolation of the 
affected area led to slower recovery efforts when 
compared to events such as the Great Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake of 1995, which occurred in one 
of Japan’s largest cities. It should also be noted 
that, while the Tohoku earthquake affected the 
predominantly-rural Tohoku district, the loss of 
power had widespread technological and socio-
economic ripple effects for urban communities 
in northeast Japan and globally.
A further impact as deleterious as the 
devastation of residential buildings and the 
long-term loss of key infrastructure (utilities, 
schools, hospitals) is population depletion due 
to migration to cities after disasters. Many of 
these people had been farmers and fishermen. 
Unlike urban residents, their lives are rooted in 
their land and communities, with houses and 
land inherited from their ancestors. The sudden 
loss of their jobs, land, homes, and families is 
catastrophic – socially, economically, and psy-
chologically. Thus, a substantial proportion of 
survivors will leave the area and relocate, re-
sulting in an even greater underpopulation of 
these rural areas. Japan’s rural areas have been 
in decline for years, and many of the small 
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coastal towns hit hardest by the tsunami had 
seen an exodus of young people moving to cit-
ies for work (Muramatsu, Akiyama 2011).
The disaster will leave long-term impacts 
on the agricultural economy and lifestyle of the 
region. An emerging issue in the recovery and re-
construction phase is the possible abandonment 
of village sites. The relocation efforts have so far 
been sensitive to preserving the social-support 
systems in earthquake-stricken communities, 
and local governments have relocated whole 
communities as intactly as possible (Muramatsu, 
Akiyama 2011). Nevertheless, rebuilding the 
completely-devastated waterfront communities 
in innovative plans that remain familiar, and can 
accommodate the largely elderly population re-
mains challenging and controversial. The event 
also serves as a wake-up call to urban communi-
ties in Japan, especially in Tokyo, where tradi-
tional customs are waning, and the elderly may 
face greater challenges.
2.3 Total Economic Impact
Reasonable estimates for direct economic losses 
from the earthquake and tsunami have ranged 
from 195 billion USD to 320 billion USD with 
a best estimate of around $270–280 billion USD 
accounting for completion and current prefectur-
al estimates. According to the Miyagi prefecture, 
around 52 % of the direct loss was due to build-
ing loss. This does not include direct losses as-
sociated with the Fukushima incident (assumed 
to be around $58–71 billion USD from TEPCO 
estimates (Daniell et al. 2011a)). In terms of di-
rect economic losses, the Japanese cabinet office 
estimated 28 % of direct losses in the four major 
affected prefectures (Miyagi, Iwate, Fukushima 
and Ibaraki), occurred inland. For the remain-
ing direct economic losses in coastal areas, it is 
estimated that approximately between 58–75 % 
resulted from the tsunami observing work of 
Miyagi prefecture and other sources (Daniell et 
al. 2011a). Thus, the following estimates of tsu-
nami, earthquake and powerplant losses results 
from the direct loss estimates of the Japanese 
Government and Prefectures as well as addition-
al CATDAT information.
Table 2 shows that around 112–145 bil-
lion USD of damage was caused by the tsuna-
mi, while 48–81 billion USD can be attributed 
to the earthquake in coastal regions. This gives 
approximately equal components of earthquake 
(52 %) and tsunami loss (48 %) for the sum of 
both inland and coastal areas. About two-thirds 
of the total losses calculated by the cabinet of-
fice and prefectural reports are housing- or in-
frastructure-related. As yet, the monetary losses 
associated with the displacement of 70,000 resi-
dents within the evacuation zones, as well as the 
decommissioning of the Fukushima plant have 
not been calculated other than estimates via 
TEPCO and other sources.
Table 2: The estimated relative building damage 
caused by the tsunami vs. the earthquake
In Billion 
USD
Earthquake Tsunami Powerplant
Direct Loss 
Inland
77 0
58–71
Direct Loss 
Coastal
48–81 112–145
Total Direct 
Loss
125–158 
(42 %)
112–145 
(39 %)
58–71 
(19 %)
Indirect Loss 69–132 64–113 51–91
Total Econo-
mic Loss
194–290 
(41 %)
176–258 
(36 %)
109–162 
(23 %)
Source: Daniell et al. 2011a
There will also be many indirect losses as a re-
sult of the Tohoku earthquake, as can already be 
seen on the example of the interruption of the 
automotive industry’s production, and the pow-
er outages. The power shortage due to destruc-
tion of the electric-power stations and network 
was assumed at the time to contribute to ripple 
effects of up to 1 trillion JPY or about 12 bil-
lion USD. Kouno (2011) estimated direct losses 
from power failures at 166.3 billion JPY and all 
of the inter-industry indirect effects to add up to 
1.5 trillion JPY.
The Tohoku region is the production center 
of Japanese semiconductors, auto parts, elec-
tronic devices, and other components. Many 
large-scale manufacturers of automobiles (e.g., 
Toyota, Nissan, and Honda), steel (e.g., Nippon 
Steel), and chemical facilities (e.g., Mitsubishi 
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Fig. 1: Proportion of fatalities from the Tohoku event from tsunami, earthquake, fire, landslide, and 
other causes
Source: Daniell, Vervaeck 2011
Kagagu) went off production, causing a decline 
in global automobile production (Norio et al. 
2011). The local industry supplies not only the 
domestic Japanese demand for industrial prod-
ucts, but also those involved around the world 
(e.g., 25 percent of the global supply of silicon 
wafers came from two semiconductor manufac-
turers which stopped working after the event) 
(Kusuda 2011). The interrupted parts- and mate-
rials-supply chain, together with the power out-
age, affected Japanese manufacturing severely, 
and rippled around the world. The car industry, 
which operates on the just-in-time principle with 
a minimum of inventory stock, suffered from 
the shortage of parts and components. Many 
key component manufacturers were based in the 
worst-hit region of Japan, which forced a slow-
down of manufacturing in Japan itself, as well as 
overseas (Kusuda 2011).
2.4 Human Losses
The human losses incurred by the Tohoku event 
were extremely severe. As of September 30th, 
2011, 15,815 were counted dead and 3,966 miss-
ing (19,781 in total). It is unknown how many 
victims may have died directly due to the earth-
quake, not counting tsunami losses. However, 
autopsies from the first 13,135 killed indicate 
that the earthquake alone did not kill many peo-
ple (NPA 2011).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of fatali-
ties of the Tohoku event from different causes. 
The total quake-related death count estimated for 
Tohoku is currently as low as 230 (Daniell, Ver-
vaeck 2011), but the actual number has uncer-
tainties. This value corresponds quite well to the 
133 non-tsunami-caused deaths that have been 
recorded in the non-coastal areas. In compari-
son, the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake resulted 
in 28,560 earthquake deaths, and the recent 1995 
Kobe quake in 4,823 earthquake deaths.
However, in terms of tsunami deaths, the 
2011 Tohoku event with 18,658 dead and miss-
ing is one of the most deadly events ever to hit 
Japan. Among the highest death counts from his-
toric tsunamis are 31,000 in Tokaido 1498, any-
where from 5,000 to 32,000 in Hoei 1707, and 
22,066 in Meiji-Sanriku 1896 (CATDAT 2011).
The maximum number of homeless and refu-
gees in shelters is hard to calculate, due to incom-
plete data in the first few days. It was likely that 
a total of around 620,000–800,000 people were 
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Fig. 2: Estimated fatalities by age for the dead and missing
Source: Estimation based on NPA results from April 21st, 2011 as a date of reference
living outside of their homes on March 12th, but 
data is lacking. With about 23 percent of Japan’s 
127 million people older than 65 (Tanaka et al. 
2009), Japan has the world’s highest proportion 
of elderly in the world. The March-11th disaster 
highlighted the current and emerging issues of 
a “super-aging” society, especially the need for 
community-based support systems. Age therefore 
played a major role in the survival chances of 
people escaping the tsunami; as people age, they 
generally become less mobile. 77 percent of all 
of the victims counted up to this point were older 
than 50, and 46 percent of the victims (nearly 
half) were over 70 years of age (Fig. 2).
The large elderly population presented a 
particular challenge for rescue teams and sur-
vival; older adults were particularly vulnerable 
to cold, influenza, relocation, and chronic mental 
and physical stress (Minami et al. 1997). Many 
suffered under lack of access to medication and 
treatment needed to control their chronic disor-
ders. As of July 24th, 2011, 570 people were re-
ported to have died due to stress and chronic dis-
ease as a result of the earthquake and the tsuna-
mi. In Japan, these are also included in the death 
toll. Stress and chronic disease contributed to 
over 90 % of the “earthquake-related deaths” in 
populations aged 65 and over (Muramatsu, Aki-
yama 2011). The inclement weather in northeast 
Japan further heightened the impact on shelter-
seeking populations, especially on the elderly. 
Due to the lack of electricity and oil, evacuated 
residents spent nights freezing in unheated shel-
ters. In addition to their injuries, many survivors 
had to deal with pre-existing chronic diseases un-
der these adverse conditions.
2.5 Nuclear Power Plant Crisis
Fuel damage and substantial releases of radio-
activity into the environment by the damaged 
Fukushima 1 nuclear power plants severely ex-
acerbated the disaster. Radiation levels in Tokyo 
had reached 20 times the normal “background” 
levels by March 15th, 2011. As could be expected 
from a disaster of this magnitude, environmental 
health hazards and associated risks extend across 
a wide range of media, including contaminated 
air, water, soil, food, and waste. Japan banned the 
export of selected food products from the north-
east of the country, and many countries placed 
restrictions on Japanese food imports, including 
normally large importers such as China and Ko-
rea. It is likely that soils exposed to high radiation 
will require reclamation, and long-term impacts 
of the disaster on plants, animals, fisheries, and 
SCHWERPUNKT
Seite 28 Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 20. Jg., Heft 3, Dezember 2011 
Table 3: List of causes, direct and indirect impacts, and exacerbating factors in the Tohoku event
Causes Direct Impacts Indirect Impacts Exacerbating Factors
Earthquake; 
Tsunami; Nu-
clear power-
plant incident
Casualties and Fatalities; Buil-
ding damage; 
Long-term damage to utilities; 
Damage to transportation infra-
structure; 
Evacuation and Displacement; 
Radiation; Landslides
Uninhabitable Homes; Supply chains 
destroyed; Local and global produc-
tion loss; Migration out of the area 
affected, Banned food exports; Long-
term impact on agriculture and fish-
eries; Delay of relief and recovery; 
Traumatized persons, anxiety and 
health concern
Aging Society; Isolation of af-
fected areas; Shortage of health 
resources; 
Lack of political transparency; 
Severe weather; Different 
power circuit topology; Lack 
of preparedness for nuclear 
emergency
Source: Own compilation
forests will be assessed in the coming decade. 
Furthermore, the nuclear power plant emergency 
in Japan has resulted in a global reconsideration 
of the safety of nuclear power.
In Fukushima, the impact of the tsunami 
and of the earthquake was not as great as in other 
places, and the real impact of the nuclear disaster 
becomes apparent in the massive displacement 
of people in the Fukushima prefecture. The total 
impact of the radiation advisory in Fukushima 
was the following: once all of the people had 
been located, and those who had been evacuated 
were counted, the total of the population who 
fled to shelters and other prefectures was around 
134,000 people, of which around 90,000–110,000 
were evacuees of the Fukushima plant disaster, 
and between 24,000 and 44,000 were probably 
earthquake- and tsunami victims. Other influ-
ences causing displacement of the population af-
fected may have included the gas-, water-, and 
power outages, landslides, and torrential rain. As 
of September 28th, 2011, around 56,000 people 
were living outside the prefecture of Fukushima, 
and around 50,000 internally (of which 42,000 
are from the nuclear-affected towns).
2.6 Causal Interactions
Natural and technical systems are involved in 
complex social systems of highly developed 
societies. The Tohoku earthquake was typical 
of disasters with cascading expansion, and dy-
namic risk-assessment procedures should follow 
from recent disaster experience that incorporates 
dynamic interactions between natural hazards, 
socio-economic factors, and technological vul-
nerabilities. In the case of Japan, the effects of 
the cascading phenomena in the long-term loss 
of electric power in large parts of Honshu, with 
all of its consequences for the economy, and the 
reverberations of the nuclear accident at Fuku-
shima 1 have critical impacts on the assessment 
of direct and indirect risks from the event.
Causality mapping (also known by several 
other names, such as Fault Tree Analysis, Event 
Tree Analysis, and Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis), is an essential tool for dynamic risk 
assessment (Hodgkinson, Clarkson 2005), as it 
can be used to provide advice for anticipating po-
tential failures, their potential causes, and their 
consequences. These methods are beneficial for 
improving understanding of the system, and for 
providing guidance for locating critical points 
for risk mitigation.
In accounting for all of the factors relevant 
during the Tohoku disaster, the main initial 
earthquake and both the tsunami and the nuclear 
power plant incidents are depicted in Figure 3. 
The direct and indirect interactions between the 
various triggering events and their causes found 
in the literature are shown. This method follows 
the tradition of System Dynamics. The map also 
depicts the concept of cascading phenomena and 
exacerbating factors in society and the economy 
triggered by the earthquake. Table 3 summarizes 
the main direct and indirect impacts resulting 
from the earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear 
power plant incident, as well as a set of factors 
that intensified these impacts.
It should be noted that, while the earthquake 
was the initial trigger, many of the direct and in-
direct impacts are themselves causes. For exam-
ple, damage to the transportation infrastructure, 
worsened by the conditions in remote areas, led 
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Fig. 3: Causal Map and direct/indirect impact chains of the Tohoku earthquake
Source: Own compilation
to hampered relief and recovery efforts. Long-
term indirect impacts on agriculture and fisher-
ies, exacerbated by a lack of support for an aging 
society, may lead to migration out of the affected 
areas and population depletion. For a more com-
plete representation of the direct and causal inter-
actions, the map in Figure 3 depicts the disasters 
and their impacts as nodes and arcs representing 
the “causal concept” and “causal connections” 
through the chain of different impact events.
3 Recent Major Catastrophes
In the following, we review very briefly some of 
the critical interactions which led to major catas-
trophes in 2010: the Haiti earthquake, the Rus-
sian wildfires, and the Pakistan floods. The aim 
is to reconstruct a pattern that has been analyzed 
in-depth for the Tohoku earthquake, but which 
is believed to be typical for extreme events of 
many types: the complex interaction of natural 
factors with societal structures and technical fa-
cilities. Some of the main loss parameters for 
these events are shown in Table 4.
3.1 Russian Fires
The very dry summer 2010, with record tempera-
tures in Western Russia, led to widespread wild-
fires. The ensuing heat wave and smog caused, 
even without fires, major crop failures and sig-
nificant burdens on the health system, as people 
suffered from heat and smog. The most fright-
ening aspect of the fires, however, consisted in 
the potential nuclear threat when fires raged near 
Sarov, the site of nuclear research- and weapon-
production facilities which had been heavily pol-
luted during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 
1986. Fortunately, these fears did not material-
ize, and no major increase in radiation levels has 
been reported. Nevertheless, this example again 
shows the adverse interactions of natural disas-
ters (drought, fire) with insufficient capacities 
to respond (fire prevention, fire fighting) and to 
reduce their adverse effects, with technological 
facilities and circumstances (nuclear installa-
tions and contamination from a previous acci-
dent). Even if one assumes that climate change 
is responsible for the most intensive heat wave 
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Table 4: The main loss parameters in each of the four catastrophes analyzed
Tohoku 2011 Haiti 2010 Russia 2010 Pakistan 2010
Main Disaster Types Earthquake, Tsunami, 
Nuclear Accident
Earthquake, Di-
sease
Heatwave, Bush-
fires
Flood, Food Shor-
tage
Main Dates 11.03.2011– 12.01.2010– 15.06.–17.08.2010 21.07–08.10.2010
Deaths < 19,781 (15,815 dead, 
3,966 missing)
136,933 
(46,190-316,000)
15,000–55,760 1,781–1,985
Injuries >6,000 310,928 n/a 3,000
Homeless 400,000–700,000 866,142–1,500,000 7,000 6,000,000
People Affected 40,000,000 2,500,000 45,000,000 20,000,000
Buildings Destroyed/ 
Uninhabitable 
118,000 78,000 2,900 1,890,000
Buildings Damaged 890,000 100,000 n/a unknown
Direct Economic Losses USD270-351bn USD8bn USD16.08bn USD9.7-30bn
Source: CATDAT 2011
Russia ever experienced, the threats it actually 
posed to society resulted from its interaction with 
societal shortcomings and dangerous technolo-
gies. The fires near nuclear installations had the 
potential to spread a regional disaster to a large 
area, including neighbouring states, via radioac-
tive contamination.
3.2 The Haiti Earthquake
The Haiti earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on Janu-
ary 12th, 2010 was a shallow earthquake which 
struck a very poor country, where 80 percent of 
the people were living below the poverty line of 
one USD per day. The immediate consequence 
of the earthquake was a widespread collapse 
of residential buildings, schools, hospitals, a 
breakdown of infrastructure (harbors, airports, 
communication, fresh- and waste water, power, 
radio), but most important, many government 
buildings collapsed. This almost complete loss 
of institutional capacity led to significant delays 
in restoring functions and services, in forwarding 
international help, and in distributing it quickly. 
The lack of governance due to unstable politi-
cal conditions greatly hampered reconstruction. 
Even after one year, many people lived in poor 
shelters, without adequate sanitary conditions. 
Consequently, a cholera epidemic spread ten 
months after the earthquake, with a total of 6,000 
deaths of nearly half a million people affected, 
among which the elderly and the children were 
the most vulnerable groups. This example shows 
that even a moderate earthquake can cause an ex-
treme catastrophe if it affects an area with a pov-
erty-stricken population living in highly vulner-
able locations and buildings, with poor govern-
ance structures, and lacking in response capaci-
ties. These circumstances bring about new risks 
– in this case, an epidemic, which again affected 
the most vulnerable persons most severely.
3.3 The Pakistan Floods
The heavy monsoon rains in Northern Pakistan 
beginning in late July 2010 caused enormous 
floods in the Indus River basin, the worst in the 
past 80 years. As a result, one-fifth of Pakistan’s 
total land area was submerged, affecting 20 mil-
lion people, mostly by destruction of property, 
of key infrastructure (power, transportation, and 
schools), and loss of livelihood. Floods sub-
merged vast areas of Pakistan’s most fertile cro-
pland in the Punjab, killed livestock, and washed 
away massive amounts of grain, resulting in a 
food crisis. This disaster hit Pakistan in a situ-
ation of poor governance and declining political 
stability, due to ineffective leadership and cor-
ruption. Civil war led to unstable conditions in 
the Northwest Frontier Province, and Taliban 
insurgents tried to take advantage of the disas-
ter wherever government representatives were 
absent, or corruption compromised trust in insti-
tutions. This example shows the interaction of a 
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natural disaster (heavy precipitation and subse-
quent floods) with weak governance and a soci-
ety stricken by civil war. It caused immense loss-
es for the economy and future growth, growing 
distrust in government institutions, and increased 
societal instability, which can have a serious im-
pact on global politics, given the fact that Paki-
stan is a nuclear power.
4 Conclusions
By evaluating the examples of the catastrophes 
discussed here, we can learn that two effects 
characterize large-scale disasters. First, they 
emerge as complex interaction patterns between 
the natural hazard, societal conditions, and the 
vulnerability of infrastructure and institutions 
on which the functionality of societies is based. 
These interactions can give rise to new risks, such 
as epidemics or nuclear radiation, and can have 
long-term consequences for the economy. Haiti 
was struck by a cholera epidemic long after the 
earthquake, the Russian wildfires had significant 
potential to cause health risks due to exposure 
to nuclear radiation, the floods in Pakistan led to 
food shortages and to further erosion of political 
stability in a region of high geopolitical impor-
tance, and the full consequences of Fukushima 1 
in Japan are yet to be seen. While foreign aid has 
brought vast quantities of food and aid to Haiti, 
without rebuilding and reform of its institutions 
and infrastructure devastated by the earthquake, 
Haiti is a victim-of-poverty trap that condemns 
its people to live unprotected in urban slums. In 
affluent countries such as Japan, the economic 
loss remains limited to a small percentage of the 
GDP, but as the earthquake has struck it in a debt 
crisis of the public financial system, a down-
grading by ranking agencies causes long-term 
losses and an increased debt-load for the state 
and its citizens.
Second, within the interaction pattern, one 
or a few circumstances become highly relevant, 
and can worsen the disaster significantly. Strik-
ing examples are the nuclear consequences of 
the Japanese earthquake and (potentially) of the 
Russian wildfires. The collapse of the organiza-
tion of the UN peace-keeping force in Haiti pre-
vented deploying 6,500 soldiers familiar with the 
country, who could have played a major role in 
immediate response, have restored the function-
ality of airports and of major roads, and have as-
sured the safe distribution of international help. 
There is a growing debate on understanding risks 
as dynamic processes, because risks change with 
time, and because hazards and/or exposure and 
vulnerability are functions of time. This view re-
sults in striving for risk monitoring rather than 
static risk assessment. Here, we add another as-
pect to the understanding of the dynamic dimen-
sion that – in our view – characterizes several 
recent catastrophes – the cascading processes 
among the three key parameters of catastrophes: 
natural phenomena, technological systems, so-
cio-economic and political functions.
Some of the implications for risk assess-
ment as a prerequisite for the mitigation of ex-
treme events are:
1. Risk analysis must consider the full complex-
ity of the interacting and cascading effects we 
face when they emerge. This analysis cannot 
be done exclusively with quantitative and 
probabilistic methods, as some of the interac-
tions are difficult to model, and uncertainties 
are not only high, but unknown.
2. The residual risks – what happens beyond 
the regulatory safety measures – are not well 
understood, neither component-wise (for in-
stance the residual risk to residential buildings 
and life safety) nor for systems (lifelines), or 
the entire complexity of potential interactions 
and cascades.
3. Scenario methodologies and stress-testing for 
extreme events may be a tool for exploring 
the key cascades, interactions, and factors 
of influence that create losses and surprises. 
In recent months, the method of stress tests 
became popular for financial institutions, in-
surance companies, nuclear power plants, etc. 
It may become an adequate disaster-manage-
ment approach for extreme events, but it has 
no scientific basis.
Note
1) Both power plants consist of several reactors and 
are situated at a distance of 12 kilometers.
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Systemic Risk in Global Finance
by Helmut Willke, Zeppelin University
The paper addresses the emergence of sys-
temic risk as a property of global finance. Part 
1 describes two factors of the post-Bretton-
Woods global financial system which John 
Eatwell has singled out as pushing the pro-
pensity for systemic risk: the focus on single 
firms, and a misguided focus on homogene-
ity. Part 2 of the paper then broadens the per-
spective in order to expose some aspects of 
a political economy of systemic risk in global 
finance. Now, after the fact of a global crisis, 
the major controversy is about the nature of 
systemic risk: is it mainly an economic prob-
lem, or is it a political issue, that is, must it be 
understood in terms of political accountabil-
ity and the limits of political regulation? Part 
3 discusses some consequences for regula-
tion and supervision within the context of ir-
reducible conflicts between national egoism 
and global collective goods.
1 Introduction
The veil of ignorance covering the operational 
modes and the consequences of arcane finan-
cial models and instruments becomes a public 
concern as soon as the failure (bankruptcy) of 
financial institutions (banks, investment firms, 
insurance companies, private equity funds, semi-
official mortgage agencies like Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac) threaten to engender system-wide 
consequences. The question is: what are system-
wide consequences?
Systemic repercussions of the (possible) fail-
ure of financial corporations are closely related to 
the notion of “systemic risk”. In general, systemic 
risks emanate from an intransparent interplay of 
layered and leveraged components of a concate-
nated compound. The case of the global financial 
system is an exemplary one, since the focus of 
all governance and regulatory action has been on 
single components, i.e., issuers, Chief Financial 
Officers, individual firms and corporations etc., 
whereas the interplay of these components has 
remained intransparent: “A lack of focus on the 
changing system characteristics of the interna-
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